Canada v. Chiarelli

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711, 1992 CanLII 87 (SCC)

• S. 7 not engaged by deportation of non-citizens itself
• PR inadmissible and ordered removed – originally on serious criminality and then supplemented with security concerns and security certificate
• Non-citizens have no unqualified right enter or remain in Canada – this is the most fundamental principle of immigration law; therefore, the deportation of PRs who do not abide by their conditions of being in Canada cannot contravene the principles of fundamental justice
• No analysis as to whether s.7 liberty is infringed here, as it is not necessary to decide the case
• No appeal to IAD if inadmissible on security grounds

o The impugned legislation is consistent with s. 7 of the Charter. Section 7 does not mandate the provision of a compassionate appeal from a decision which comports with principles of fundamental justice. The right to appeal from the adjudicator’s decision, first to the Board on questions of fact or law or mixed fact and law, and then to the Federal Court of Appeal with leave on questions of law, offers ample protection to an individual from an erroneous decision by the adjudicator and clearly satisfies the principles of fundamental justice. The absence of an appeal on wider grounds than those on which the initial decision was based does not violate s. 7. There has never been a universally available right of appeal from a deportation order on “all the circumstances of the case”.

• From Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 SCR 350, 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII):

o 16 … In considering this claim, the Court, per McLachlin C.J., noted, at para. 46, citing Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 87 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 733, that “[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada”. The Court added: “Thus the deportation of a non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the liberty and security interests protected by s. 7” (Medovarski, at para. 46 (emphasis added)).

17 Medovarski thus does not stand for the proposition that proceedings related to deportation in the immigration context are immune from s. 7 scrutiny. While the deportation of a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features associated with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certificate process or the prospect of deportation to torture, may do so.