Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 2, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72

  • Application of process in Suresh (2002 SCC), regarding danger opinions and the removal of persons previously recognized as Convention Refugees
  • Court shows a high degree of deference with respect to Minister’s assessment of Ahani’s danger to public as well as assessment of likelihood of torture on return
  • There must be substantial grounds for believing that the individual would face torture upon deportation
  • Ahani did not demonstrate that there were substantial grounds to believe that he would face a risk of torture in Iran
    • See Thuraisingam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 607 (CanLII), for an example of a case where the risk assessment in the danger opinion process was found to be unreasonable
  • See Hasan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1069 (CanLII), 75 Imm LR (3d) 64, at para. 10, for a description of the Suresh danger opinion process. Hasan dealt with inadmissibility for serious criminality:
    • [29] The principles governing the proper approach to be taken by the Minister’s delegate in conducting a danger opinion under paragraph 115(2)(a) of IRPA are well established in the jurisprudence and have been summarized by the Court of Appeal in the following manner:
    • (1) A protected person or a Convention refugee benefits from the principle of non-refoulement recognized by s.115(1) of IRPA, unless the exception provided by paragraph 115(2)(a) applies;
    • (2) For paragraph 115(2)(a) to apply, the individual must be inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality (s. 36 of IRPA);
    • (3) If the individual is inadmissible on such grounds, the delegate must determine whether the person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis that he or she is a danger to the public in Canada;
    • (4) Once such a determination is made, the delegate must proceed to a s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (the Charter) analysis. To this end, the delegate must assess whether the individual, if removed to his country of origin, will personally face a risk to life, security or liberty, on a balance of probabilities. This assessment must be made contemporaneously; the Convention refugee or protected person cannot rely on his or her status to trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter (Suresh, above, at paragraph 127);
    • (5) Continuing his analysis, the delegate must balance the danger to the public in Canada against the degree of risk, as well as against any other humanitarian and compassionate considerations (Suresh, above, at paragraphs 76-79; Ragupathy, above, at paragraph 19).
  • Interestingly, see Galvez Padilla v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 247 (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/fwg4f, at paragraphs 37 and subsequent for incorporation of 33(2) of the Refugee Convention into part (3) of the Hasan explanation above. In other words, the crimes or acts underlying the danger opinion (and associated facts/circumstances of those crimes and acts), must rise to the level of a “particularly serious nature” in order to warrant the danger opinion